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BANKRUPTCY’S ROLE IN THE GROWING DILEMMA OF
SELF-BONDING IN THE COAL INDUSTRY
ABSTRACT
The coal industry is experiencing increasing market challenges and many
of our nation’s largest coal producers are filing for bankruptcy. In the wake of
insolvency, coal companies are leaving behind abandoned mines with no one
to mitigate the damage. There are long-standing regulations mandating coal
companies post bonds for land restoration after mining operations are
complete. Coal companies can use financial liquidity to satisfy these bonds,
known as self-bonding. Yet, companies are using the fiscal strength of
subsidiaries instead of their own accounts to self-bond. Ultimately, a company
can appear financially healthy enough to qualify for reclamation bonds, but
not have enough cash to cover full clean-up of mining sites. Bankruptcy
highlights the insufficiency of such reclamation procedures and the supporting
bonding process.
This Comment evaluates several ways to cope with the self-bonding
problem under the existing bankruptcy framework, including the existing
requirements of the good faith and feasibility requirements, and proposes a
carved out exception within the Bankruptcy Code disallowing prior coal
bankruptcy debtors from self-bonding. The carve-out offers the most effective
solution at targeting only the misuse of bankruptcy while still allowing the
institution to provide effective relief to innocent debtors. The proposed carveout states: No coal company seeking relief under or arising from this statute
shall: (a) include self-bonding within its reorganization plan, nor (b) qualify
for self-bonding in the future under any provision of 30 C.F.R. § 800.23.

HEARD_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

206

12/12/2017 11:32 AM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

INTRODUCTION
Coal companies are experiencing various market pressures pushing them
toward bankruptcy. Growing insolvency of the mining industry leaves
environmental degradation for the government to clean-up. While the current
safeguards are meant to protect land previously mined for coal from being
abandoned, there remains a loophole. Applicable regulations require an active
coal mining site to be able to pay to remediate the land once mining activities
have ceased. There are various ways a coal company can post these mandatory
“reclamation bonds.” One way, known as self-bonding, allows a company to
use its financial strength to show the company does not need to set aside
specific funds because it is solvent enough to foot the bill. But coal companies
can escape responsibility by falsely reporting the financial ability to pay for the
clean-up, and later seek to be absolved of that obligation through bankruptcy.
There are various ways in which bankruptcy can discourage self-bonding
by a coal company currently or previously in bankruptcy. This Comment will
explore potential remedies offered through bankruptcy procedures, either in the
existing Code, an amended Code, or through court discretion. One
recommendation is that a court could deny a reorganization plan that includes
self-bonding under the reasoning that it does not satisfy all of the plan
confirmation requirements.1 Specifically, self-bonding does not satisfy the
good faith and feasibility requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) and
§ 1129(a)(11).2 The ideal solution will be a court-created, or Code-amended
carve out that explicitly prohibits a previous debtor in bankruptcy to avail
themselves of self-bonding again. The carve-out would prevent companies
with a history of abusing the reclamation bonding scheme while allowing other
companies with no such history to continue to self-bond responsibly.
Alternatively, bankruptcy courts could suggest changes either in support of the
Department of the Interior’s notice and comment process, or for Congress to
change the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (“SMCRA”) entirely.
I.

BACKGROUND

Coal played an integral role in the expansion and the success of the United
States economy by powering transportation, electricity, and the Industrial

1
In order to get an approved reorganization plan in chapter 11, a debtor must satisfy all sixteen
separate confirmation requirements under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2012). See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2012).
2
See 11 U.S.C § 1129(a)(3) (2012).
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Revolution.3 The coal industry gave many Americans employment in a time
where the country needed it the most.4 Unfortunately, the negative effects of
the industry on the environment and human health eventually became
apparent.5 A statement given to the Committee on Natural Resources in 2013
recalled the physical destruction caused by coal mining:
During the mid 1970s, most counties in the Appalachian coal fields
were dotted with hundreds of small surface mines . . . . From both the
small and large operations I saw streams choked with sediment, and
spoil and rocks dumped on the downslope in steep terrain. I
witnessed the results of unpredictable blasting events and saw the
exposed highwalls and abandoned entries that were left behind.6

A. The Harms of Coal Mining
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), charged with protecting
human health and the environment, attributes the growing consequences of
climate change to the greenhouse gas effect, primarily from emissions of
carbon dioxide through the burning of fossil fuels.7 In fact, carbon dioxide
(CO2), a major byproduct of coal consumption, “is the primary greenhouse gas
pollutant, accounting for nearly three-quarters of global greenhouse gas
emissions and 84% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.”8 The effects of climate
change have become so severe that 2016 was the hottest year in recorded
history, beating out 2015.9 This increase in temperature is also accompanied by

3
See A Brief History of Coal Use, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, http://www.fossil.enegry.gov/
education/energylessons/coal/coalhistory.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2017). Coal use expanded during the
Industrial Revolution to power steamships and steam-powered railroads, the chief forms of transportation,
which used coal to fuel their boilers.
4
See id.
5
See The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) of 1977: A 30th Anniversary Review,
Statement of Earl Bandy, Chief, Applicant Violator System Office, Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and
Enforcement (OSM), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES (July 25,
2007), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg37013/html/CHRG-110hhrg37013.htm.
6
Id.
7
See Causes of Climate Change, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, https://19january2017
snapshot.epa.gov/climate-change-science/causes-climate-change.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2017).
8
Learn About Carbon Pollution From Power Plants, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/learn-about-carbon-pollution-power-plants.html (last
visited Sept. 3, 2017).
9
See NASA, NOAA Data Show 2016 Warmest Year on Record Globally, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-noaa-data-show-2016-warmest-yearon-record-globally (last visited Nov. 8, 2017).
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changes in the weather and overall climate of Earth.10 According to the EPA,
“many places have seen changes in rainfall, resulting in more floods, droughts,
or intense rain, as well as more frequent and severe heat waves.”11 The Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has also identified various health
effects correlated with severe weather, air pollution, water quality degradation,
extreme heat, food supply impacts and environmental degradation as a
whole.12
In an effort to reduce CO2 emissions and combat the effects of climate
change, nations across the globe have signed the Paris Agreement.13 The
United States is the only country to reject the treaty and maintain the status quo
of emissions.14 But American coal is still in danger. While Washington debates
climate change, global demand for coal is already declining.15 American coal
companies optimistically relied on the increase in demand for coal by
industrializing countries such as China and Australia.16 However, the line of
growth in coal consumption is not quite the predicted straight line.17 In fact,
coal demand for exports has not even remained constant; it has declined.18 As
countries across the world become more aware of environmental degradation,
they are demanding less coal use and increasing their own reliance on
renewable energy sources instead.19 The United States is losing export

10
See Climate Change: Basic Information, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, https://
19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climagechange/climate-change-basic-information.html (last visited Sept. 3,
2017).
11
Id.
12
See id. (“The health effects of these disruptions include increased respiratory and cardiovascular
disease, injuries and premature deaths related to extreme weather events, changes in the prevalence and
geographical distribution of food- and water-borne illnesses and other infectious diseases, and threats to mental
health.”).
13
See Paris Agreement, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://
unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf (last visited Nov. 9,
2017).
14
See Lisa Friedman, Syria Joins Paris Climate Accord, Leaving Only U.S. Opposed, NEW YORK
TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/climate/syria-joins-paris-agreement.html.
15
See Coal Production Declines in 2016, With Average Coal Prices Below their 2015 Level, U.S.
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=
29472.
16
See Australia, PEABODY ENERGY, http:www.peadboydenergy.com/content/398/austrial-mining (last
visited Sept. 3, 2017).
17
See Coal Production Declines, supra note 15.
18
See U.S. Coal Exports Declined 23% in 2015, as Coal Imports Remained Steady, U.S. ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=25252.
19
See Hydroelectric Plants Account for More than 70% of Brazil’s Electric Generation, U.S. ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=27472.
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business.20 Recent data shows that in 2014, China not only used more crude oil
and natural gas, but also used less coal.21
When it comes to the impact of coal mining, perhaps even more troubling
are the diseases cited by the CDC that plague individuals who live and work in
coal towns and inhale mine dust.22 These diseases include: pneumoconiosis,
silicosis, bronchitis, emphysema, and Black Lung.23 Combined, these diseases
have led to thousands of deaths and left countless others with severely
diminished qualities of life.24 Even in light of the dangers, coal companies
have not felt the need to mitigate the damage caused by their industry. The
environment and its inhabitants continue to suffer due to coal mining even in
an age of environmental consciousness and scientific awareness. One
unfortunate consequence of the coal industry’s negative externalities is the
increase of ghost towns caused by rampant unemployment.
Consider the coal mining town of Lindytown, West Virginia. According to
Sierra Club, Appalachian mountaintop-removal mines have destroyed an
estimated 1.4 million acres of forested land, buried an estimated 2,000 miles of
streams, poisoned drinking water, and wiped whole towns off the map.25
Lindytown is on its way to being another statistic as it has experienced both the
“boom” and “bust” of surface coal mining.26 Lindytown is located in southwest
West Virginia and was surrounded by mountains and forests, until coal mining
began.27 Residents initially thrived off of the introduced industry; families
throughout the town had both employment and a purpose.28 But the laborintensive underground mining eventually transitioned to machine operated
surface mining.29 Residents were left unemployed while health and safety
conditions continued to deteriorate due to daily blasting and visible coal dust.30
20
21

ENERGY
14691.

See U.S. Coal Exports Declined, supra note 18.
See Oil and Natural Gas Import Reliance of Major Economies Projected to Change Rapidly, U.S.
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=

22
See Jay Colinet, Health Effects of Overexposure to Respirable Silica Dust, SILICA DUST CONTROL
WORKSHOP (Sept. 28, 2010) https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/UserFiles/workshops/silicaMNM2010/1Colinet-HealthEffects.pdf.
23
See id.
24
See id.
25
The Cost of Coal, SIERRA CLUB, http://vault.sierraclub.org/sierra/costofcoal/west-virginia/default.
aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2017).
26
See id.
27
See id.
28
See Dan Barry, As the Mountaintops Fall, a Coal Town Vanishes, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 12, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/13/us/13lindytown.html.
29
See id.
30
See id.
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Instead of helping the community, the occupant coal company at the time,
Massey Energy, chose to reduce its liability by simply buying out residents that
had lived in Lindytown for generations.31 The large coal company began
making offers in December 2008, and by the beginning of 2011, only one or
two families remained in the entire town.32 The holdouts consist of a
generation unwilling to leave their family homes, including Alzheimer’s
sufferer Quinnie Richmond and her son.33 Yet none of the remaining residents
blame the younger generation for getting out. They suggest, “[y]ou might as
well take the money and get rid of your torment . . . after they destroyed our
place.”34 Clearly, coal mining has immense economic and social externalities.
B. Self-Bonding and Bankruptcy
Lindytown is just one example within one region of coal mining.
Lindytown’s plight is an unfortunate paradigm found throughout Appalachia
and coal mining towns across the nation. If the coal industry remains afloat in
the face of such degradation, what protections are available to the remaining
employees and residents of coal towns in the instance of coal company
bankruptcy? Their only hope rests with decades old legislation. In 1977,
President Jimmy Carter signed into law the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977.35 Under SMCRA regulations, before mining
operations begin, a coal company must apply for and pay reclamation
performance bonds to guarantee its ability to restore and clean-up mining sites
after use.36 There are several allowable types of bonds, including collateral and
surety bonds.37 Financially stable coal companies, however, are allowed to
“self-bond” for these environmental clean-up liabilities by showing they can
afford to clean-up mining sites when the time comes.38 That is, fiscally healthy
coal companies are allowed to guarantee reclamation obligations without any
type of collateralized financial assurance.39
31

See id.
See id.
33
See id.
34
Id.
35
See generally 30 C.F.R. § 800.12 (2012).
36
See generally id.
37
See id.
38
See generally id. § 800.12(c).
39
See id. § 800.23(b)(3) (“To meet the financial requirement, the Act requires an applicant to either (1)
have an “A” or higher rating from Moody’s Investor Service or Standard and Poor’s Cooperation; (2) a
tangible net worth of $10 million, a ratio of total liabilities to net worth or 2.5 or less, and a ratio of current
assets to current liabilities of 1.2 times or greater; or (3) fixed U.S. assets of at least $20 million, a ratio of total
liabilities to net worth of 2.5 times or less, and a ration of current assets to current liabilities of 1.2 times or
greater.”).
32
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Self-bonding worked well when coal was a booming and resilient business,
because companies were financially stable enough to maintain sufficient funds
for reclamation. In fact, maintaining liquidity of funds, that otherwise would
have been set aside for reclamation bonds, allowed American coal companies
to thrive and stay competitive in the global market.40 Self-bonding has become
so popular that there are approximately $3.86 billion in outstanding self-bond
obligations across the United States.41 From a business perspective, that means
billions of dollars are not tied up in reclamation bonds that corporations can
use to reinvest and grow.
But growth alone is not the issue. As coal companies expand operations,
the effects on the environment and human health will compound, especially if
mines are abandoned and land is left un-reclaimed.42 Environmental harm
resulting from growth of the coal industry is twofold. First, coal mining results
in severe environmental impact including air pollution from dust, groundwater
pollution from mine runoff, and safety concerns associated with abandoned
mines.43 Second, the burning of coal at power plants also creates a myriad of
externalities such as an increase of atmospheric CO2 and other pollutants that
impact global and human health.44
To make matters worse for the coal industry, it had been experiencing
problems with coal demand even before the bad publicity of climate change.
Some of the factors contributing to the decline in demand for coal include
lower natural gas prices, lower international demand, and reduced domestic
energy use due to warming temperatures. 45 Moreover, the United States’ final
coal production in 2016 projects have been seventeen percent lower than in
2015—the lowest level since 1978.46 This single year decrease in production is
not an isolated event. Coal production has dropped in every major coal region
by at least fifteen percent—a continuation of an eight-year decline from peak
production in 2008.47 Additionally, a report by the Carbon Tracker Initiative

40
Australia, supra note 16 (coal companies can use the extra liquidity to invest in foreign markets
rather than be tied up by bonds).
41
Jayni Foley Hein et al., Self-Bonding in an Era of Coal Bankruptcy: Recommendations for Reform,
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW (Aug. 2016), http://policyintegrity.org/files/
publications/Coal_Self-Bonding_Report.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2017).
42
See generally Climate Effects on Health, supra note 42.
43
See generally id.
44
See Climate Change Decreases Quality of the Air We Breathe, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/climateandhealth/pubs/air-quality-final_508.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2017).
45
See Coal Production Declines, supra note 15.
46
See id.
47
See id.
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found that more than 260 mines closed between 2001 and 2013, and just since
2009, the market value of the U.S. coal sector has dropped by seventy-six
percent.48
Competitors like natural gas and renewable energy also have a large impact
on coal production. Natural gas, although still a fossil fuel, has a carbon
intensity eighty-two percent lower than that of coal. 49 Not only is natural gas a
cleaner alternative to coal, it is becoming increasingly cheaper.50 With lower
prices, cleaner emissions, and more efficient extraction,51 natural gas is simply
outcompeting coal. In 2015, natural gas consumption was eighty-one percent
higher than coal consumption, and “in 2016, natural gas surpassed coal as the
primary fuel used for power generation in the United States, supplying an
estimated 34% of the nation’s electricity, compared with 30% for coal.”52
Renewable energies are also becoming a more prominent player in the
energy market. In 2015, the share of renewable energy consumption in the
United States was at almost ten percent, the largest proportion since the
1930s.53 While almost all renewables have seen an increase, solar and wind
generation have seen the greatest growth for electricity generation.54 The
growing percentage of renewables is also not a function of declining sources of
fossil fuels; for the third year in a row, more than half of new additions to the
power grid are renewable technologies, again with a large increase of wind and

48
Andrew Grant & Luke Sussams, The U.S. Coal Crash: Evidence for Structural Change (Mar. 2015),
http://www.carbontracker.org/report/the-us-coal-crash/.
49
Energy-related CO2 Emissions From Natural Gas Surpass Coal as Fuel Use Patterns Change, U.S.
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=
27552.
50
Natural Gas Prices in 2016 Were the Lowest in Nearly 20 Years, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=29552 (“Natural gas spot
prices in 2016 averaged $2.49 per million British thermal units (MMBtu) at the national benchmark Henry
Hub, the lowest annual average price since 1999.”).
51
See Growth In U.S. Hydrocarbon Production From Shale Resources Driven By Drilling Efficiency,
U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.
php?id=15351.
52
Natural Gas Prices, supra note 50.
53
Id.
54
Fossil Fuels Still Dominate U.S. Energy Consumption Despite Recent Market Share Decline, U.S.
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (July 1, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=
26912 (“Liquid biofuels have also increased in recent years, contributing to the growing renewable share of
total energy consumption.”).
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solar.55 Due to a combination of reasons, the value of coal has declined by the
“highest annual percentage decrease of any fossil fuel in the past 50 years.”56
This decline in coal production poses a substantial threat to coal companies
and coal mining towns.57 As unemployment rates for coal industry employees
are continuing to rise, more and more regions of the country are beginning to
resemble Lindytown, West Virginia.58 The crisis became such a national
concern that President Donald Trump ran on a platform promising thousands
of new jobs to disparaged coal towns.59 Since in office, President Trump has
rolled back President Barack Obama’s moratorium on coal leases on federal
lands and vetoed regulations promulgated by the Office of Surface Mining.60
While these efforts appeal to disparaged coal towns, President Trump cannot
“save” coal for multiple reasons.
First, coal is not failing because there are not enough places to mine; coal
is struggling because the free market is forcing coal out.61 Driving up the
demand for coal would require direct government intervention mandating
consumption—an unlikely option. Second, President Trump’s policies relating
to natural gas actually allow other forms of energy to outcompete coal.62
President Trump supports increased access to natural gas, which will only
stabilize prices and continue to drive down demand for coal.63 The best
President Trump can do is to perhaps extend the life of the dying industry, but
the evidence suggests coal will never return to what it once was.64
55
See Renewable Generation Capacity Expected To Account For Most 2016 Capacity Additions, U.S.
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=
29492.
56
Fossil Fuels Still Dominate, supra note 54 (“The most significant decline in recent years has been
coal: U.S. coal consumption fell 13% in 2015, the highest annual percentage decrease of any fossil fuel in the
past 50 years. The only similar declines were in 2009 and 2012, when coal fell 12% below the level in the
previous year.”).
57
Assault On Coal Brings High Unemployment To Eastern Kentucky, INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY
RESEARCH (Dec. 5, 2013), http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/federal-governments-assault-on-coalbrings-high-unemployment-to-eastern-kentucky/ (stating unemployment rates increasing up to the highest rate
in Wyoming of twenty percent for surface coal mining between 2010 and 2011).
58
Id. (unemployment rates increasing up to the highest rate in Wyoming of twenty percent for surface
coal mining between 2010 and 2011).
59
An America First Energy Plan, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/america-firstenergy (last visited Jan. 22, 2017).
60
See Eric Lipton and Barry Meier, Under Trump, Coal Mining Gets New Life on U.S. Lands, NEW
YORK TIMES, (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/06/us/politics/under-trump-coal-mining-getsnew-life-on-us-lands.html; Stream Protection Rule, Pub. L. No. 115-5, 131 Stat. 10 (2017).
61
Renewable Generation Capacity, supra note 55.
62
An America First Energy Plan, supra note 59.
63
Natural Gas Prices, supra note 50.
64
See Renewable Generation Capacity, supra note 55; Natural Gas Prices, supra note 50.
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As demand for coal declines, there is a higher risk of financial problems,
and the question of coal companies filing for bankruptcy becomes a matter of
when, not if. Current legislation regulating coal operations includes safeguards
for the environment in times of financial hardship. It is recognized that “a
bedrock principle of environmental law and regulation is that pollution costs
should be borne by their creators.”65 Thus, requiring a company to bond for
their environmental reclamation shifts the risk of default from the public to the
private sector.66 But the system fails when those bonding safeguards allow
companies to skirt their responsibilities.
The SMCRA sets certain minimum requirements to ensure coal companies
restore mined land.67 Under SMCRA, a person must post an adequate
reclamation bond before receiving a permit to conduct surface coal mining
operations.68 The reclamation bonds required by SMCRA must be “sufficient
to assure the completion of the reclamation plan if the work had to be
performed by the regulatory authority in the event of forfeiture.”69 A permittee
must provide and maintain an adequate reclamation bond from the initial day
of mining operation throughout the life of the authorized mining operation.70
In certain limited circumstances, regulators may allow a permittee to meet
the reclamation bonding requirements by providing a “self-bond.”71 Self-bonds
were created to allow coal companies to avoid setting aside reclamation funds
when they are liquid enough to pay for entire reclamation projects.72 A state
with a permitting agency may or may not allow self-bonding.73 Any state
program authorizing the use of self-bonding must “assure that the regulatory
authority will have available sufficient money to complete the reclamation plan
for any areas which may be in default at any time” and “must provide a
substantial economic incentive for the permittee to comply with all reclamation
provisions.”74 In order to qualify, the filing company must have a ratio of total

65
James Boyd, Financial Responsibility for Environmental Obligations: An Analysis of Environmental
Bonding and Assurance Rules (Aug. 2001), http://www.ucl.ac.uk.cserge/Boyd.pdf.
66
David Gerard, The Law and Economics of Reclamation Bonds, 26 RESOURCES POLICY 189, 190
(2000).
67
30 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012).
68
30 C.F.R. § 800.11 (2012).
69
30 U.S.C. § 1259(a) (2012).
70
62 Ill. Adm. Code 1800.13 (2012).
71
30 C.F.R. § 800.23 (2012).
72
See 30 U.S.C. § 1259(c) (2012).
73
30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e) (2012).
74
Id.; see Bond and Insurance Requirements for Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Operations
Under Regulatory Programs; Self-Bonding, 48 Fed. Reg. 36418-01 (Sept. 9, 1983). The summary stated:
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liabilities to net worth of 2.5 times or less, and a ratio of current assets to
current liabilities of 1.2 times or greater.75
If, after a permit is issued, it becomes clear that a company’s financial
situation no longer meets the established standards, the permittee must either
replace the bond within a limited period of time or must “cease coal extraction
and . . . immediately begin to conduct reclamation operations in accordance
with the reclamation plan.”76 But companies that are not financially healthy
enough to self-bond can use a loophole: self-bond through wholly-owned
subsidiaries that look healthy on paper, but in reality are no more solvent than
their parent companies.77 The language of the self-bonding rules allows for
financial requirements to be met by “the applicant or its parent corporation
guarantor.”78
In 1988, the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement
amended C.F.R. § 800, allowing third parties to guarantee a self-bond.79 Courts
The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM) is promulgating new rules
on self-bonding pursuant to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. States are
not required to adopt self-bonding rules. This rule establishes the minimum standards of financial
eligibility to self-bond for States that wish to allow self-bonding. The applicant for a self-bond is
required to demonstrate at least 5 years of continuous operation and: financial solvency
demonstrated by an “A” or higher bond rating; or, a tangible net worth of at least $10 million,
plus certain financial ratios; or, ownership of at least $20 million of tangible fixed assets, plus
certain financial ratios. The amount of all self-bonds that regulatory authorities may accept would
be limited to 25 percent of the applicant’s tangible net worth. Several other criteria for selfbonding also are established. A regulatory authority may accept the guarantee of a qualifying
parent corporation for its subsidiaries. These rules replace the previous rules which were
suspended.
75

30 C.F.R. § 800.23(b)(3) (2012).
Id. § 800.16(e).
77
See id. § 800.23(c)(1).
78
Id.
79
Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Operations; Permanent Regulatory Program; Performance
Bonds; Bond Release Application, 53 Fed. Reg. 994-01 (Jan. 14, 1988). The summary stated:
76

The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE) of the U.S. Department
of the Interior (DOI) is amending the rules that govern the information required in an
application to release a performance bond to include the name of the permittee and amending
the bonding rules to allow third parties to guarantee a self-bond. These revisions are in
accordance with the Secretary’s brief of March 5, 1984, in which the Secretary addressed the
National Wildlife Federation’s challenge to the omission of the permittee’s name in the
published notice of bond release and in response to a June 16, 1986, petition for rulemaking
from the National Coal Association/American Mining Congress (NCA/AMC) Joint Committee
on Surface Mining Regulations requesting that OSMRE amend its rules to allow third parties to
guarantee a self-bond. The rules were proposed on November 26, 1986, with a comment period
that closed on February 5, 1987. Six parties commented on this proposal. These final rules are
adopted for the permanent regulatory program.
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have recently read this provision as permitting a struggling parent to lean on its
affiliate companies.80 Two of the country’s largest coal companies, Arch Coal
and Alpha Natural Resources, are among those that used the financials of their
subsidiaries to qualify for self-bonding.81 The practice of essentially using
another company’s financials to qualify for self-bonding violates the trust that
permitting agencies give to coal companies.82 While using an affiliate to
maintain self-bonding qualifications may have worked in an era when the coal
market was more resilient, the current volatile market has sent some of the
country’s largest coal companies into bankruptcy. Exacerbating the problem,
“energy companies who self-bond lack a diversified business and participate in
a rapidly changing commodity market; they are therefore at a higher risk of
default.”83
Although this issue has been brought to the attention of the U.S.
Department of the Interior, the agency charged with managing self-bonds, its
current guidelines are merely suggestions.84 Meanwhile, three of the country’s
largest coal companies have filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy, and there are
likely more self-bonded coal companies following in their footsteps.
Examining patterns of past coal bankruptcies will demonstrate the problem of
self-bonding in an unstable industry and highlight the areas in which the
institution of bankruptcy can improve.
C. Case Studies: Recent Coal Bankruptcies
Chapter 11 bankruptcy is appealing to coal companies because it allows
them to stay in business while they sell off assets and reorganize.85 But
shutting down entire mining operations and communities could have major
negative ramifications. A coal company may also seek additional benefits from
a chapter 11 reorganization, including the sale of assets “free and clear of
80

See 30 C.F.R. § 800.23(c)(1) (2012).
Letter from Maria Cantwell & Richard J. Durbin, U.S. Senators, to Hon. Gene L. Dodaro,
Comptroller Gen. of U.S. (Mar. 8, 2016).
82
30 C.F.R. § 800.23(g) (2012).
83
Dion W. Hayes & Sarah Link Schultz, Light Out! Hot Topics and Recent Developments in EnergyRelated Chapter 11 Cases, Am. Bankr. Inst. 259 (June 2016).
84
Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Interior, Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement to
Initiate Rulemaking on Self-Bonding for Coal Mines (Aug. 16, 2016) (Proposing goals for a new rulemaking
process that would modify self-bonding eligibility standards, provide for third-party review, collateralize a
certain percentage of self-bonds, make replacement bonds more attainable, and minimize risks associated with
corporate sureties that rely on cash flow basis to cover reclamation costs when bonds are forfeited; however,
the notice and comment rulemaking process may take a while and may not even be binding on all states).
85
Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter
11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 875–876 (Jan. 2014).
81
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encumbrances” which then turn to proceeds.86 Therefore, by going through a
chapter 11 proceeding, a coal company can avoid posting reclamation bonds,
continue to operate its business, and make money from any assets sold. These
incentives to file for bankruptcy, rather than posting collateral reclamation
bonds, are in conflict with the fundamental purpose of reorganization, which
“is to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of
jobs and possible misuse of economic resources.”87 It is a “misuse of economic
resources” in multiple senses for a company to avoid posting the legally
required reclamation bond by first self-bonding through a subsidiary and then
file for bankruptcy.”88 The following are examples of major coal companies
that have filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in similar fashions.
1. Arch Coal
Arch Coal self-bonded through a subsidiary, Arch Western Resources, and
owed $458 million in self-bonded claims.89 Arch Coal was allowed to continue
operations while in bankruptcy, with a majority of its reclamation liabilities
un-bonded.90 While the reemerged Arch Coal was required to post substitute
bonds, the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality stated in a letter in
March of 2016 that its subsidiary, Arch Western Resources, still qualified for
self-bonding.91 This means that there are no restrictions on using the subsidiary
to self-bond in the future. The letter from the Wyoming Department of
Environmental Quality suggests that they will continue to allow Arch’s
subsidiaries to benefit from self-bonding, and potentially allow Arch to selfbond through them or on their own in the future.92
Although Wyoming requires companies to provide reclamation bonds, they
also have an incentive to allow the practice of self-bonding to continue because
self-bonding means more money in a company’s pocket.93 Consequently, states
that allow self-bonding have an automatic advantage of attracting coal
companies (and their tax money) over states that do not offer self-bonding.
Even after a state permits a self-bond, it is incentivized to help the company
86

Id.
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984).
88
Id.
89
Arch Coal Asks U.S. Bankruptcy Court to Ease its Cleanup Costs, REUTERS (Jan. 11, 2016), http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-arch-coal-cleanup-idUSKCN0UP2GT20160111.
90
Restructuring Information, ARCH COAL, http://www.archcoal.com/restructuring/ (last visited Feb. 10,
2017).
91
Letter, supra note 81.
92
Id.
93
See id.
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flourish—coal mining continues to fund communities across the country, and
halting operations due to a violation of a reclamation bond could bring
hardship to thousands of Americans.94
Minor cyclical downturns in the coal market are a trend of the past, and
allowing a coal company to go bankrupt without sufficient reclamation bonds
could mean that the government, and in turn taxpayers, are responsible for the
cleanup costs.95 Despite the incentives that both the state and the coal company
have to continue to self-bond, Wyoming should not have left open the
possibility for a prior bankruptcy debtor. Unfortunately, this trend continued
with the bankruptcy of Alpha Natural Resources.96
2. Alpha Natural Resources
Alpha Natural Resources, with a total of $676 million in self-bonds
throughout the country, of which $411 million is for bonds in Wyoming alone,
filed for bankruptcy in multiple states in 2015.97 The company self-bonded
with a subsidiary’s financials, claiming the subsidiary could cover the cost of
the bonds.98 Yet, the subsidiary did not have enough assets to cover $676
million in bonds, leaving Alpha in violation of their mining permit.99 The court
was faced with two options: suspend mining licenses for violating bond
requirements or look past the illegality of Alpha’s actions and allow operations
to continue. Suspending a mining license would effectively stop all function of
Alpha’s mines, causing income streams to stop and leave many citizens
unemployed. Repealing a license would also push Alpha further into financial
distress, causing it to be even less likely to pay to reclaim mined property. At
the risk of exacerbating the issue, Wyoming allowed Alpha to continue to
operate in exchange for a small percentage of their bond responsibility during
the bankruptcy process.100
Alpha’s problems, however, continued. Alpha purchased Massey Energy,
the coal company that bought Lindytown, and later filed for bankruptcy in
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See id.
See id.
96
Id.
97
In re Alpha Nat. Res., Inc., 544 B.R. 848 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016).
98
See Casper Star Tribune, Uncharted Territory: What do Alpha Natural Resources Self-Bonding Woes
Mean? (June 4, 2015), http://trib.com/business/energy/uncharted-territory-what-do-alpha-natural-resourcesself-bonding-woes/article_407af6fe-0244-530c-a8fc-cd53cc0a5e83.html.
99
In re Alpha Nat. Res., Inc., 544 B.R. 848.
100
See Letter, supra note 81.
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West Virginia.101 The court acknowledged that if the state did not approve the
coal company’s reorganization plan, Alpha “would be required to immediately
post over $244 million in substitute bonds in order to continue mining in West
Virginia.”102 The court approved the settlement with West Virginia because
“given the Debtors’ limited liquidity, this could be a substantial hurdle that
could impair the Debtors’ reorganization efforts.”103 Although in this instance,
Alpha was allowed to “gradually transition away from the self-bonding
problem” after successfully reorganizing, there was no agreement that Alpha
would be unable to self-bond in the future.104
In the end, Alpha was able to avoid paying full price for reclamation bonds
by first using subsidiaries that could not foot the bill to self-bond, then turning
to bankruptcy to escape paying collateral bonds, and finally restructuring
through bankruptcy without becoming precluded from repeating the same
pattern. So how does a company become so financially unstable that a
bankruptcy court confirms a plan in order to avoid liability that could be
incurred by the state?
An impending bankruptcy should be foreseeable to a devaluing coal
company, triggering the requirement to notify their permitting agency when it
falls out of self-bond eligibility and post another approved bond method within
ninety days.105 In the case of Alpha’s bankruptcy, the company had notified the
Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality that it was no longer eligible
for its outstanding self-bonds, yet it filed for bankruptcy before the end of the
ninety day requirement to post other bonds.106 Alpha likely filed for
bankruptcy at the last minute, right before having to pay millions in a required
bond, because it was experiencing a “melting ice cube”107 effect. Essentially, a
company is considered a “melting ice cube” if its assets are rapidly declining in
value.108 Companies that are showing “ice cube” characteristics frequently rely
on bankruptcy for a quick sale of their property.109 Alpha turned to bankruptcy
for relief because it experienced a decline in assets, so much so that neither
self-bonding nor collateral bonding requirements could be met.

101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

In re Alpha Nat. Res., Inc., 544 B.R. at 857.
Id.
Id.
Id.
30 C.F.R. § 800.23(g) (2012).
Id.
Jacoby, supra note 85, at 875–76.
Id.
Id.
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Under SMCRA, a coal company is in violation of its permit if it does not
have a reclamation bond of any sort, which can result in consequences such as
a suspended permit.110 Yet during the bankruptcy, Wyoming stayed
enforcement action on the unmet reclamation bond requirements and allowed
the companies to pledge a “supermajority claim” to the state based on the
chance that the company did not exit chapter 11.111 The claim, approved by the
bankruptcy court, was for $61 million, and nowhere near the necessary $411
million pledged for reclamation costs.112 Alpha was fortunate enough to regain
financial strength and replace all its prior self-bonds. The final restructuring
and approved plan designated for Alpha required them to transfer all $411
million to secured bonds, but did not specify that Alpha could not avail
themselves to self-bonding further down the road.113 Moreover, the actions
taken by Wyoming do not stop other states from issuing self-bonds and
exacerbating the problem of $3.86 billion in outstanding self-bonded
obligations.
3. Peabody Coal
Most recently, Peabody Coal, another one of the United States’ major coal
companies, and the world’s largest publicly owned coal producer, filed for
bankruptcy in April 2016.114 Although federal requirements demand that a selfbonding applicant “has a ratio of liabilities to net worth of 2.5 or less and a
ratio of current assets to liabilities of 1.2 or greater,” Peabody had a ratio of
liabilities to net worth of 11.6 and a ratio of current assets to liabilities of
0.84.115 Peabody filed with debt of $10.1 billion total, and $1.1 billion in selfbonding across four states, with $727 million in liabilities located within
Wyoming alone.116 Unlike the two previous major coal bankruptcies, Peabody
did not file a plan for reorganization contemporaneously with its bankruptcy
filing.117 Therefore, it is still unknown if they will propose self-bonding or if
Wyoming would object.118
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30 U.S.C. § 1232(d) (2012).
See Letter, supra note 81.
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In re Alpha Nat. Res. Inc., 544 B.R. at 853.
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Id.
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Tracy Rucinski & Tom Hals, Leading Global Coal Miner Files for Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Apr.
2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-peabody-energy-bankruptcy-idUSKCN0XA0E7.
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Peabody is also facing issues in Illinois. Peabody’s Illinois Basin selfbonding is done through a wholly-owned subsidiary of Peabody Energy,
Peabody Investments Corporation.119 Peabody has nationwide issues with selfbonding, and worldwide financial problems; as such, an issue arises if Peabody
takes a substantial hit in bankruptcy. In order to protect American jobs and
allow Peabody to have its “fresh start,” bankruptcy courts may be tempted to
approve a plan that allows Peabody to continue to self-bond or return to it
shortly after.
The goal of bankruptcy to provide a debtor with a “fresh start”120 is at odds
with the public policy driving reclamation bonds.121 Not all companies filing
for bankruptcy deserve a fresh start, especially if they are attempting to avoid
their reclamation liabilities. In the cases of Alpha and Arch, who both posted
self-bonds through the financials of affiliate companies, filing for bankruptcy
forced the court to choose between allowing reorganization or shutting down
operations and ensuring non-compliance with reclamation liabilities. But a
major problem arises when a company cannot survive reorganization, or when
emerging companies from reorganizations, such as Alpha’s phoenix company
Contura Energy, begin the same pattern of self-bonding in five years.122 Or, in
the case of Patriot Coal, file for bankruptcy twice.123 In such situations,
bankruptcy would effectively have had no deterring force at all in stopping the
coal company from engaging in irresponsible self-bonding practices.
D. Litigation Tactic Cases
The stories of Alpha and Arch Coal are illustrative of what is known as the
“litigation tactic case.”124 Cases that fall under this category typically occur
when pressures mount from an external dispute that incentivizes a bankruptcy
119

Id.
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (the court noted the purpose of bankruptcy was to
give “the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.”).
121
OSMRE created reclamation bonds to clean up the environmental damage done to land and water
systems by mining operations. The goal of reclamation is to return the land to pre-mining quality and avail it to
the same uses. Reclamation Performance Bonds, OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.osmre.gov/resources/bonds/bondsoverview.shtm (last visited Sept. 10, 2017).
122
New coal companies, including newly formed reorganized companies, cannot qualify for selfbonding until they have operated for five years.
123
Matt Jarzemsky & Peg Brickley, Patriot Coal Again Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, NEW YORK
TIMES (May 12, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/patriot-coal-files-for-chapter-11-bankruptcyagain-14314
35830.
124
F. Stephen Knippenberg & Lawrence Ponoroff, Legal Theory: The Implied Good Faith Filing
Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 NW. U.L. REV. 919, 938 (1991).
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filing.125 These disputes can include “evident intention to circumvent state law
requirements regarding the posting of a . . . bond as a condition to appealing an
adverse judgment.”126 The bankruptcy court has discretion to consider intent
when allowing a bankruptcy case to proceed.127 The court should use this
discretion to take the current energy market, and purpose for filing for
bankruptcy into consideration.
Current projections for the energy market predict coal consumption
inevitably declining with no rebound in sight.128 Unfortunately, as the coal
market continues to fall, more companies are likely on the same path to
bankruptcy. The chances of a coal company recovering, even if being allowed
to restructure, are slimming. While a coal company loses its grasp on the
market, it may not be focused on cleaning up after itself. Such a shift in focus
negatively affects places like Lindytown. The problem is compounding
because the law is letting it. Yet the shelter that coal companies seek in
bankruptcy during times of financial distress can change the course of harm
left in the wake of the dying coal industry.
II. ANALYSIS
The institution of bankruptcy has two main instruments that operate to
carry out its intended purposes of proving debtors with a fresh start and fair
treatment to creditors.129 Both of these tools, the Code and the bankruptcy
court, can be used to illicit change. Bankruptcy courts are more commonly
dealing with business issues “related only incidentally, if at all, to the problems
of default and immediate financial ruin.”130 The expansion of the bankruptcy
court’s scope, for better or for worse, has caused an increase of debtors turning
to the court to avoid or decrease their bond requirements.131 As a result, coal
companies are increasingly looking for relief in the bankruptcy system.
Bankruptcy as an institution has gradually become a forum to which parties
have turned to resolve basic business and economic problems that are not
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Id.
Id.
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11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2012).
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Fossil Fuels Still Dominate, supra note 54 (“U.S. coal has seen as significant decline: consumption
fell 13% in 2015, the highest annual percentage decrease of any fossil fuel in the past 50 years”).
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Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 244 (1934).
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Knippenberg, supra note 124, at 966.
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Id. at 938 (“Commercial debtors have shown an increased willingness to use the bankruptcy law both
as a tactic in business litigation and as an instrument of business planning.”).
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satisfactorily addressed elsewhere.132 Coal companies are misusing bankruptcy
courts as a forum for escaping traditional requirements of reclamation
bonding.133 In turn, the courts have to bear the costs of a company abusing the
aims of bankruptcy.134 While abuse of bankruptcy is not recommended, the
capacity to institute change on a federal level suggests that the bankruptcy
system is perhaps the best place to address the issue of inappropriate selfbonding in the coal industry.135 There are three main areas in which bankruptcy
can become a tool to combat the increasing probability of un-reclaimed coal
mines: the existing Code, a proposed carve-out to the Code, and the role of
bankruptcy judges to steer the use of bankruptcy in the right direction.
A. Evaluating Tools Within the Existing Code to Discourage Inadequate SelfBonding
The Code provides two main provisions that can act as a backstop against
debtors filing for relief to avoid fulfilling required bond amounts covering
reclamation costs of mining property: the good faith and feasibility
requirements.
1. Good Faith
First, the Code provides a “good faith” provision to discourage inadequate
self-bonding. If a coal company were to have filed for bankruptcy for the sole
purpose of using the procedural incidents of bankruptcy to secure a tactical
advantage, the good faith requirement may provide an existing stop within the
Code.136 Section 1129(a)(3) requires that: “[t]he plan has been proposed in
good faith and not by any means forbidden by law.”137 Some courts focus on
the debtor’s pre-petition conduct, similar to the good faith requirement under
§ 362(d)(1) and § 1112(b).138 The Code does not define “good faith,” for
purposes of determining good faith under § 1129(a)(3), and the most common
point of inquiry by the court is the plan itself and whether such a plan will
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Id. at 966.
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Id.
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ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 92 (Erwin
Chemerinsky et al. eds., 7th ed. 2015) (preferring federal environmental policy over state policy, one reason
being that federal regulation promotes a uniform approach).
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11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2012).
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fairly achieve a result consistent with the objectives and purposes of the
Code.139
The good faith requirement provides an additional check on a debtor’s
intentional impairment of claims. Good faith is evaluated on a case-by-case
basis,140 but it serves as a condition to securing chapter 11 relief. Failure to
satisfy the good faith requirement constitutes “cause,” sufficient for dismissal
under § 1112(b).141 Specifically, a proposed plan: “must be ‘viewed in light of
the totality of the circumstances surrounding confection’ of the plan [and] . . .
the bankruptcy judge is in the best position to assess the good faith of the
parties’ proposals.”142 The totality of the circumstances that may be considered
includes a myriad of factors depending on the circuit. Subjective intent is not
wholly determinative.143 The most common test requires “a demonstration of
both the inability to formulate an effective reorganization plan and improper
motivation in filing”144 in order to serve the “various and conflicting interests
of debtors, creditors and the courts.”145
Bankruptcy courts have a great deal of discretion regarding rulings on a
“good faith” challenge.146 One court even expressed the discretion as a
mechanism to “allow courts to utilize their gut feeling about a plans effects.”147
A judge should take all situational factors into consideration and “the reading
of the law should be tempered by the judge’s sense of equity—what is just in
the circumstances of the case. If there are objective facts to support this
feeling, perhaps the plan should not be confirmed.”148 Moreover, by using
“common sense” logic, even though a coal company has a plan that it can
afford, if it self-bonded through a subsidiary it may not automatically pass the
good faith test. Arguably in some instances, it should not.
A company could easily have prior bad actions and still propose a plan that
will achieve the goals of bankruptcy with fairness. However, in a situation
similar to that of Arch Coal, who filed for bankruptcy at the end of their
ninety-day period to post a bond, lack of good faith may be relevant. In
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11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2012).
Jorgensen v. Federal Land Bank (In re Jorgensen), 66 B.R. 104, 108–09 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1986).
In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 426 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 424–25 (quoting In re Jasik, 727 F.2d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1984)).
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Knippenberg, supra note 124, at 926.
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Marsch v. Marsch, the debtor filed for chapter 11 in order to avoid posting an
appeal bond in regard to a legal judgment.149 The court found that using
bankruptcy to delay or avoid judgments, or as a litigation strategy, is an act in
bad faith.150 The court dismissed the case, reasoning that the filing had
objectives outside the legitimate scope of the bankruptcy laws.151 Although
there may be an exception for when a bond could disrupt a debtor’s business,
in the case of a coal company a bond that is required for business is not likely
one that would “disrupt” it.152 Applying the policy behind the holding in
Marsch, a coal company that chooses to file for bankruptcy, when it has the
ability to post alternative bonds, within ninety days of losing self-bonding
eligibility would arguably be acting in bad faith.
Unfortunately, there are varying opinions regarding the meaning of “good
faith.” The discrepancy between the views on the underlying purposes of
bankruptcy can alter the outcome of bankruptcy filings, and in particular the
satisfaction of a successful plan.153 On one hand, if the primary goal, and the
only factor in a good faith analysis, were that a debtor could successfully
complete their reorganization plan, “the implicit good faith filing requirement
will never stand in the way of Chapter 11 filings by large, resource-rich
business enterprises.”154 This definition of good faith would seemingly always
favor a debtor coal company as they are traditionally known as “resourcerich.” Yet with the current changes to the energy sector, a court should more
critically examine the company’s ability to reorganize. On the other hand, if
the purpose of bankruptcy is to protect the integrity of the process, then each
case will be determined based on whether its continuance would compromise
the purposes of bankruptcy. The court’s inquiry may be influenced, but not
controlled, by the size of the debtor.155 This understanding is more in line with
Marsch, as it looks to whether the case was filed in line with the purposes and
goals of bankruptcy.
Outside of the two purposes for the good faith requirement, there are two
general opinions of bankruptcy goals: Traditional or Collectivist.156 The
149

In re Marsch, 36 F.3d at 825.
Id. at 828 (finding that a debtor using bankruptcy to avoid judgment of the law when they could
likely afford the judgment is not entitled to the protection of bankruptcy).
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Traditional view holds that debt collection is always relevant, but it can be
sacrificed when necessary to achieve other goals of bankruptcy.157 Conversely,
for Collectivists, bankruptcy is merely a means of federal debt collection.158
The paradigm that arises with coal companies filing for bankruptcy with selfbonds is that neither goal of bankruptcy would be met, as it is possible for both
bad faith and insufficient debt collection to be involved. Therefore, a coal
company with a reorganization plan that approves or allows room for an
inadequate reclamation self-bond, especially by a subsidiary, would be in
violation of “good faith” and violation of the public policy interest in
reclaiming mined lands.
2. The Feasibility Requirement
Second, the Code provides a “feasibility requirement” that discourages
inadequate self-bonding. Section 1129(a)(11) could provide additional support
that a proposed or potential future self-bond could not be included in a
sufficient reorganization plan. Section 1129(a)(11) establishes the financial
feasibility requirement: “Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed
by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor
or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or
reorganization is proposed in the plan.”159 In determining whether a plan meets
the requirements of § 1129(a)(11), the bankruptcy court must take a close look
at the plan to ensure that there is a reasonable chance of success.160 Several
courts have considered the following factors when determining if a plan is
feasible:
(1) the adequacy of the debtor’s capital structure; (2) the earning
power of its business; (3) economic conditions; (4) the ability of the
debtor’s management; (5) the probability of the continuation of the
same management; and (6) any other related matters which determine
the prospects of a sufficiently successful operation to enable
performance of the provisions of the plan161

The feasibility test and the good faith requirement are not mutually
exclusive, yet they are loosely linked. For example, if the court is within a
jurisdiction that takes pre-bankruptcy behavior into consideration for
evaluating the good faith requirement, a coal company using bankruptcy to
157
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160
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Id. at 959.
Id. at 949–50.
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avoid posting full collateral bonds will likely fail the feasibility requirement of
plan confirmation.162 In this situation, the feasibility requirement serves as a
second check on the integrity of the debtor. Unfortunately, that will not always
be the case.
If a coal company filed for bankruptcy in a jurisdiction that looks at the
probability of plan success as a factor in the good faith analysis, then the plan
would automatically pass the feasibility test as well. In other words, if a plan is
feasible, and treats all creditors fairly, it follows that it would also be made in
good faith to carry out the purposes of bankruptcy. Under the current Code,
being able to successfully complete a reorganization plan, despite using the
proceedings to avoid full collateral bonds, does not forbid a coal company
from self-bonding in the future.
In the case of coal companies, the unique nature of a debtor satisfying
legally required bonds through a subsidiary may provide a new problem for the
bankruptcy court. Plan confirmation does not typically require the court to look
at how other companies could affect the feasibility of the plan.163 Yet, the
relationship between parent and subsidiary company in the context of selfbonding may create an exception in which a third-party company could affect
the feasibility of a debtor’s reorganization plan. Normally, if a plan meets
§ 1129 (a)(11), that does not mean the court looked to the financial strength of
the debtor company’s subsidiaries.164 This is a potentially huge oversight,
especially if the company has the ability to use subsidiaries to self-bond in the
future. A bankruptcy court faced with this situation should use their
discretionary powers to consider both the parent company’s financial strength
as well as that of its subsidiaries. The broad discretionary powers given to the
bankruptcy courts allow judges to make decisions based on fairness.
Overall, the Code as it stands may not be the ideal tool to combat
insufficient reclamation bonds. But the flexibility that the Code offers may
allow a court to consider and weigh multiple factors to deal with the case
equitably. Some of these factors, like the good faith and feasibility
requirements, are not new to bankruptcy courts. Other factors also arise out of
the unique circumstance of a “litigation tactic case” by coal companies. For
example, courts may have to inquire into the financial stability of subsidiary
companies to accurately predict the success of a plan under both the good faith

162
163
164

See generally id.
11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a)(11) (2012).
Id.
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and feasibility requirements. Most of these factors will guide the court to
dismiss a case for bad faith or lack of plan feasibility.
However, there are factors pushing in the direction of allowing such a case
to proceed. In some situations, the driving force behind giving debtors a fresh
start may override any suspicious acts a company has engaged in in the past or
any dishonest intentions it had for filing for bankruptcy. Even if the Code were
equipped to punish companies for skimping on self-bonds, the bankruptcy
court would still face policy issues. Dismissal of a case could lead to permit
violations, worsening a company’s financial situation along with the hope of
full mining reclamation. These implications exacerbate the problems faced by
coal companies and why many seek shelter in bankruptcy. So why not try to
stop coal companies from self-bonding in the first place?
B. Potential Changes: Create a Carved Out Exception Within the Bankruptcy
Code
Currently, under the SMCRA, a company can requalify for self-bonding
five years after they come out of bankruptcy and can financially qualify.165
This scheme opens the possibility of creating even more problems in the future
as the coal market continues to act unpredictably. This Comment proposes a
carved-out exception to the current Code explicitly disallowing a coal
company, including any company that arises from the reorganization, from
either proposing self-bonding in its reorganization plan or later entering
bankruptcy with self-bonds. The proposed carve-out states:166
No coal company seeking relief under or arising from this Title shall:
(a) include self-bonding within its reorganization plan, nor
(b) qualify for self-bonding in the future under any provision of
30 C.F.R. § 800.23.

The proposed carve-out would have several characteristics. First, the carveout would be applicable no matter how many years a company had been out of
bankruptcy and would provide multiple benefits. It would promote the purpose
of self-bonding, allowing financially stable companies to have the option to
use that to their advantage, and retain more of their liquid assets. Second, the
carve-out would not ban self-bonding entirely. Self-bonding would still be
available for smaller coal companies with a smaller fraction of their
reclamation bonds in self-bonding or for companies that are diverse with assets
165

30 C.F.R. §§ 800.23 (b)(2)–(3) (2012).
This use of “carve-out” differs from the phrase’s other use in setting aside funds in a financing order
for a debtor in possession.
166

HEARD_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

2017]

12/12/2017 11:32 AM

SELF-BONDING IN THE COAL INDUSTRY

229

outside of the coal market. Lastly, the carve-out allows for easy enforcement
for both the permitting agency and the bankruptcy court by avoiding judgment
calls required under the current state of § 1129(a).
Having a clear rule stating no coal company that filed for bankruptcy or
received a discharge can apply for self-bonding would cut down on both the
initial research costs as well as costs associated with monitoring compliance
throughout the life of the bond.167 By knowing what to expect throughout the
bonding process, the rule would also incentivize current self-bond holders to
manage their bonds properly. In many ways, this carve-out will provide a
check on the purposes of bankruptcy. Instead of providing a safe-haven and a
“fresh start” for companies that are trying to avoid bond requirements,
companies will only turn to bankruptcy when they need it the most. The
benefits to self-bonding are great enough to induce companies to choose to
reduce the percentage of its self-bonds rather than file for bankruptcy. The risk
of losing self-bonding altogether by filing for bankruptcy will lead to a
reduction in bankruptcy filings.
A carve-out would also have certain costs. If the Code explicitly
disallowed a type of permit from being issued, through an exception, it could
conflict with § 525. Section 525(a) stipulates:
a governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to
renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to,
condition such a grant to, discriminate with respect to such a grant
against, deny employment to, terminate the employment of, or
discriminate with respect to employment against, a person that is or
has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Act.168

An outright denial of a bond, by a permitting agency, to a previous bankruptcy
debtor would fall under the definition of “refuse to renew a . . . permit.”169 This
requirement is consistent with one of the aims of bankruptcy that provides a
fresh start in which the reorganized entity is treated as a new company in the
eyes of the law. 170 The section is intended to allow a struggling company to

167

Gerard, supra note 66, at 190.
11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2012).
169
Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Angelucci, 145 B.R. 895, 900 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992) (alluding in dicta
that if the Workers’ Compensation Board revoked the Certificate of Self Insurance for the sole purpose of
debtors’ affiliation with bankruptcy it would be discrimination in violation of § 525(a)).
170
In re A.J. Lane & Co., 133 B.R. 264, 274 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (“A bankruptcy statute . . . is to be
interpreted with basic bankruptcy policies in mind, including the policy of promoting a “fresh start” for the
debtor.”).
168
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recover without additional hardship via discrimination.171 A “fresh start,”
however, may not be in line with the public policy behind requiring a company
to take responsibility for their environmental liabilities.172

Under § 525, there are serious implications to allowing a coal company
to turn to bankruptcy at the first sign of financial trouble without placing
any long-term punishment on it for shifting the environmental risk to the
public. Places such as Lindytown cannot afford to bear the costs of
cleaning up if the coal company were to file for bankruptcy and leave
reclamation bonds unfulfilled. Bankruptcy proceedings will not reduce the
damage to coal towns across the nation. The weight of the public policy
toward a clean and healthy environment suggest that the benefits of the
carve-out should outweigh the strictness of § 525. There are two potential
ways to remedy the conflict between the proposed carve-out and § 525: an
explicit exception or invocation of constitutional avoidance.
1. Create an Exception Under 11 U.S.C. § 525
Congress could simultaneously pass an explicit exception under § 525
along with the carve-out. The exception would acknowledge that although
barring a debtor from permits would normally be a violation of § 525, doing so
in the context of a coal company in self-bonding would not produce such a
violation. Without a violation of § 525, the carve-out would effectively protect
human health and the environment from the potential consequences of
bankruptcy.
The idea of creating a carve-out with an exception in § 525(a) is not new.
Section 525(a) carves out three federal statutory exceptions to the general ban
against discrimination by governmental units: the Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act, 1930,173 the Packers and Stockyard Act, 1921,174 and
section 1 of the Act entitled “An Act for Making Appropriations for the
Department of Agriculture for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1944 and for
Other Purposes.”175 These existing exclusions show that Congress can make
exceptions favoring public policy under the correct circumstances. An explicit

171
See generally John C. Chobot, Anti-Discrimination Under the Bankruptcy Laws, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J.
185 (1986)
172
See generally Boyd, supra note 65.
173
7 U.S.C. §§ 499a–499s (2012).
174
Id. §§ 181–299.
175
Id. § 204 (2012).
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exclusion from the reach of § 525 would bar any argument that the carve-out
was unlawful discrimination against a debtor.
2. Approve the Carve-Out Through the Canon of Constitutional Avoidance
Assuming the carve-out passed, the court could side-step the conflicting
policies by using the canon of constitutional avoidance. Invoking the canon
would allow the court to assume that Congress did not intend to violate § 525
through the sole act of affirming the carve-out. Essentially, the court is allowed
to extrapolate that Congress would not pass any legislation that would be
contradictory.176 Constitutional avoidance would likely be deferred to as it is
widely accepted to have become a “cardinal principle” of statutory
interpretation.177 In Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, the court stated that “where an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court
will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is
plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”178 In other words, a court will
assume that Congress did not intend to create a conflict between statutory
provisions because finding otherwise would mean Congress had violated the
Constitution.
Even though a carve-out would likely prove to be effective in bankruptcy
proceedings, the current political climate is an important factor weighing
against the timely enactment of a carve-out. The 114th Congress is in a state of
extreme partisanship and legislative standstill, and matters regarding energy
are at a particular point of contention.179
A major energy bill is currently before Congress.180 The North American
Energy Security and Infrastructure Act of 2016 passed the Senate and House
but is still before Congress resolving issues.181 The bipartisan bill purports to
boost oil and natural gas production, yet encourage renewable energy sources,

176

See Massachusetts Trustees of E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235, 242 (1964).
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001).
178
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988); see also Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corp of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172
(2001) (“[A]ssumption that Congress does not casually authorize administrative agencies to interpret a statute
to push the limit of congressional authority.”).
179
Chris Mooney, The Senate Just Passed-Overwhelmingly-an Actually Bipartisan Energy Bill, THE
WASHINGTON POST (April 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/
04/20/the-senate-just-passed-overwhelmingly-an-actually-bipartisan-energy-bill/?utm_term=.8db223be66ea.
180
North American Energy Security and Infrastructure Act of 2016, S. 2012, 114th Cong. (2016).
181
Id.
177
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such as wind and solar power, and increased energy efficiency.182 Although the
bill has passed both the House and Senate, it was not without hurdles and it has
still not made it out of Congress. The House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi
referred to the bill as “a partisan, special interest package that fails to invest in
infrastructure, leads to more energy consumption and carbon pollution, stacks
the deck against the environment and . . . undermines protections for our public
lands and wildlife.”183
Meanwhile, House Speaker Paul Ryan, believes the bill “modernizes our
energy infrastructure so we can address urgent priorities for the country, from
tackling California’s drought crisis to healing our forests in order to prevent
wildfires.”184 The difference of opinions regarding the current energy bill
combined with the political uncertainty arising from the Trump administration
demonstrates the difficulty that a bankruptcy carve-out regarding coal mining
would face in being passed. A delayed or stalled enactment of the carve-out
would do little to the current and ongoing environmental harm, especially
considering the coal market is in decline. Also standing in the way of a quick
adoption of a carve-out to the Code are lobbyists. Creating such a blanket
barrier to self-bonding would not go unnoticed in Washington.
Adopting a carve-out would likely be the best way that bankruptcy could
improve insufficient self-bonding to reclaim coal mines. The carve-out within
the Code would not require judges to use discretion to evaluate whether cases
are feasible or brought in good faith. It would allow a clear policy to apply to
all debtor coal companies and would reduce uncertainty. Moreover, the carveout would incentivize companies to comply with the self-bonding regulations
at the outset, likely reducing the bankruptcy court’s docket.
But the carve-out will face resistance. Unfortunately, because of the current
Congressional climate, the biggest opposing force against passing the carveout is time—the one thing that the citizens of coal regions cannot afford.
Realistically, solutions outside of the current Code may provide for a faster
solution to the issue of irresponsible self-bonding through subsidiaries.

182
Congressional Energy Bill at Standstill Over Drilling, THE INTELLIGENCER (June 7, 2016), http://
www.theintelligencer.net/news/top-headlines/2016/06/congressional-energy-bill-at-standstill-over-drilling/.
183
Id.
184
Id.
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C. Solutions Outside of the Bankruptcy Code
Although the bankruptcy court and judges must work within the confines
of the Code, they still have the ability to influence change. Judges are often the
first to identify flaws within the system and encourage reform. Following in
Justice O’Connor’s footsteps, the bankruptcy court could make a call to the
federal government to incentivize change.185 With Peabody nearing the end of
its bankruptcy proceedings and the inevitability of more coal bankruptcies
becomes apparent, the court has the perfect opportunity to instill a sense of
urgency to improve. The court can encourage three major changes; a bill
amending SMCRA; amendments to the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation
and Enforcement’s permitting regulations; and amending the Code to
disincentivize misuse of the institution, such as the proposed carve-out in this
Comment.
1. Encourage a Bill Amending the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act
The bankruptcy court could express support for Congress to pass a bill
amending SMCRA.186 There is currently a bill introduced to the House that
proposes to amend 30 U.S.C. § 1259 to entirely disallow self-bonds from being
approved and requiring all outstanding bonds to be replaced by otherwise
acceptable bonds under SMCRA.187 An amendment to SMCRA would rid
reclamation costs of uncertainty and eliminate all monitoring costs for the
permitting agency, which is required when the agency certifying a coal
company qualifies for self-bonding, whether it be a state or the Office of
Surface Mining and Reclamation Enforcement.188 The outcome of the bill
depends on the climate of Congress. While there is a split between the House
and Senate on the energy bill, there may be hope for regulation regarding
environmental enforcement.189 On June 22, 2016, former President Obama
signed a bill reforming the Toxic Substance Control Act of 1976, the first

185
Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 286 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stressing the importance in
protecting environmental policy interest).
186
H.R. 5500, 114th Cong. (2016) (“To protect taxpayers from liability associated with the reclamation
of surface coal mining operations, and for other purposes.”).
187
Id.
188
See David Gerard, The Law and Economics of Reclamation Bonds, 26 RESOURCES POLICY 189, 191
(2000), http://faculty.lawrence.edu/gerardd/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2014/02/22-RP-Gerard-bonding.pdf.
189
Congressional Energy Bill, supra note 177.
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substantial change to an environmental statute in twenty years.190 This
willingness to pass an amendment to an environmental statute by both political
parties suggests that Congress may be willing to put aside differences in a
changing world with increasing environmental risks. However, as with an
amendment to the Code, the uncertainty of Congress’s timeliness presents a
problem. Time is of the essence when families and communities are being
affected now.
People across the nation are being impacted by the coal industry.
Environmental justice, the concept that certain people are disproportionally
affected by environmental harms, is a movement that tries to bring awareness
to and mitigate the issue. Moreover, the people that are most affected are those
that are linguistically, racially, or economically isolated.191 Unfortunately,
situations like Lindytown are common across the country, as citizens who
cannot afford to go head-to-head with large companies are forced to live in
unhealthy environments. In that sense, the communities that were able to
relocate were the fortunate ones.192 Yet, if operating mines are already
disproportionately affecting families that cannot afford to move or speak out,
abandoned mines that do not have adequate bonds to reclaim them will only
exacerbate the environmental justice issue.
The United States Department of Interior, and in turn the Office of Surface
Mining and Reclamation Enforcement, is required to take environmental
justice into consideration when making decisions.193 In 1994, former President
Clinton signed an Executive Order ensuring that “each Federal agency shall
make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and
addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health
190
Gina McCarthy, TSCA Reform: A Bipartisan Milestone to Protect Our Health from Dangerous
Chemicals, EPA (June 2016), https://blog.epa.gov/blog/2016/06/tsca-reform-a-bipartisan-milestone-to-protectour-health-from-dangerous-chemicals/.
191
See David Deganian & Justine Thompson, The Patterns of Pollution: A Report on Demographics and
Pollution in Metro Atlanta 3 (Mar. 2012), https://greenlaw.org/pdf/PatternsofPollutionFINALGreenLaw3-262012.pdf.
192
A study from The Mountain Association for Community Economic Development found that:

While coal employment has brought decent jobs and wages to a region in desperate need of
employment opportunities, eastern Kentucky remains one of the most economically distressed
regions in the country. The poverty rate in Appalachian Kentucky was nearly double that of the
nation in 2000. Even within eastern Kentucky, coal-producing counties are among the most
economically distressed counties. The top coal-producing counties have some of the highest
poverty rates in the region.
Economic Status of Coal Producing Counties, MOUNTAIN ASSOCIATION FOR COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, http://www.maced.org/coal/coal-counties.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
193
Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 C.F.R. § 32 (Feb. 1994).
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or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority
populations and low-income populations.”194 Each federal agency is required
to have an Environmental Justice Strategic Plan in which they outline how they
will fight for Environmental Justice.195 The Department of the Interior is
charged with SMCRA permits and is not excepted from the scope of the
Environmental Justice Executive Order.196 The Office of Surface Mining and
Reclamation, allowing coal companies to self-bond their environmental
reclamation liabilities, is not in line with preventing “adverse environmental
impacts . . . through integration into its programs [and] policies.”197
Unfortunately, the Executive Order’s permissive language does not provide a
strong enforcement mechanism and is commonly skirted by agencies.198
A bill amending SMCRA, disallowing self-bonding, would assume the
policy behind the Executive Order and force coal companies to internalize
clean-up costs. The benefits of factoring in environmental justice when
considering the proposed bill extend beyond remediating current harms, but it
will work to prevent future inequality as well. While not mandated, Congress
should consider the environmental justice implications when deciding on the
proposed bill to eliminate self-bonding. The bill would both relieve the
government from the risk of incurring environmental liabilities while
protecting the people that live in mining communities, who are susceptible to
environmental injustice.
Unfortunately, there are drawbacks to passing a complete ban on selfbonding. Because the ban on self-bonding would arise from the bankruptcy
context, the action may run afoul of § 525. The bill would be comparable to the
carve-out in the Code in denying a previous debtor of a mining permit.199

194

Id.
Id.
196
Environmental Justice, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/oepc/resources/
environmental-justice (last visited Nov. 1, 2016). The Department of the Interior takes the stance on
Environmental Justice that:
195

While the Department is committed to protecting the environment and health of all
communities, the Department’s environmental justice strategy is particularly focused on
ensuring that minority and low-income communities do not suffer from disproportionate
adverse environmental impacts. Ultimately, the Department strives to achieve its environmental
justice goals through integration into its programs, policies, and activities to help ensure all
people—including minority and low-income populations—receive fair treatment and the
opportunity to engage and meaningfully inform the Department’s decision-making processes.
197
198
199

Id.
Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 C.F.R. § 7629 (Feb. 1994).
11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2012).
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Policy concerns also arise from removing self-bonding entirely. Complete
removal of self-bonds will force financially stable companies to put aside
assets that were previously liquid. The declining coal market is one of the
major reasons financially unstable companies should set aside sufficient
reclamation bonds; yet, in light of the current health of the coal market, now is
the worst time for a stable coal company to lose liquidity.
The court must weigh the policies between remediating the environmental
harm and justice concerns, with market projections and impacts, when
evaluating whether to support the bill amending SMCRA. Like any balancing
test, it is difficult to weigh human injustices against economic factors. The
trends show that while the coal market is beginning to be out-competed,
environmental justice concerns are on the rise. It is not likely that the court can
save the coal industry any more than President Trump can, but it can support
the SMCRA amendments in an effort to right the wrongs occurring to
American citizens and their homes.
2. Endorse Amendment to Permitting Regulations
Similar to supporting the SMCRA amendments, the bankruptcy court could
advocate for the Department of the Interior and the Office of Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcement (“OSMRE”) to change the regulations regarding
the issuance of self-bonding permits. The OSMRE has already undergone
notice and comment rulemaking and promulgated an amendment to its
regulations for reclamation bonds.200 The stated goals of rulemaking would in
fact improve the self-bonding situation by making qualifications stricter rather
than a blanket ban.201 But just recently, Congress has invoked the

200

Press Release, supra note 84. For the notice and comment rulemaking period, OSMRE has set the

goal to:
(1) Modify self-bonding eligibility standards, including for parent and other corporate
guarantors, to include criteria that are more forward looking, instead of only focusing narrowly
on past performance; (2) Provide for an independent third party review of self-bonded entities’
annual financial reports and certification of the current and future financial health of selfbonded entities; (3) Establish the percentage of all self-bonds to be supported by collateral that
is not subject to any other lien or used as collateral for any other liability; (4) Provide
diversification for financial assurance/reclamation bonds for each mine to prevent a single
entity from providing 100% of the bond for a mine (except for cash bonds); (5) Provide
regulatory authorities with better tools for obtaining replacement bonds when a self-bonding
entity no longer meets the self-bonding eligibility criteria; and (6) Minimize the risks associated
with corporate sureties that rely on a cash flow basis to cover the cost of reclamation when its
bonds are forfeited.
201

Id.
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Congressional Review Act and rejected the OSMRE’s amended regulation,
thus leaving the previous and weaker regulations still in force.202 OSMRE’s
action proves the deficiency of the self-bonding regulations. Additionally,
Congress’s subsequent attempt to veto stronger rules reinforces the need for
bankruptcy to play a role in the implementation of self-bonds. The status of the
new regulations remains unclear, but if they are vetoed under the current
administration, the need for stricter regulations in the future will be even
stronger.
3. Endorse the Carve-Out Proposed Herein
Perhaps the most effective change the bankruptcy court could endorse is
the carve-out proposed in this Comment to the Code regarding self-bonding.
Creating a carve-out would provide the best of both worlds. It would allow
financially responsible, resilient, and diverse companies to benefit from not
having to set aside specific reclamation funds while also reducing the risk of a
company that misused the bonds from availing themselves of it again.
Suggesting or even holding that a previous bankruptcy debtor could never
refile for a self-bond could be a step in the right direction. Moreover, making a
call to Congress to amend the Code may be the option most within the scope of
a bankruptcy court’s powers. Support for a change in the Code from
bankruptcy judges—those that deal with the Code the most—would have a
persuasive impact on Congress to enact a carve-out for irresponsible selfbonding.
The existing framework of the Code as well as SMCRA are insufficient to
tame the nation’s billion-dollar problem of self-bonding. Bankruptcy courts
should use their influence and expertise to call on Congress to change the
future of human health and environmental degradation caused by under-funded
mine reclamations. In doing so, the court will have to weigh policies such as
efficiency of Congressional action, environmental justice, energy market
economics, and feasibility of proposed actions and rulemaking. Forming a
position on how bankruptcy can affect the uncertainty and harms arising from
self-bonding and tactical litigation could go a long way in moving the practice
in the right direction.
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See Stream Protection Rule, supra note 60.
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CONCLUSION
Coal mining companies are self-bonding, declaring bankruptcy, and
leaving an environmental mess with no one responsible for clean-up. Families
in coal mining regions, like Lindytown, West Virginia, are forced to stay and
deal with the hazards of coal mining, or become displaced from their homes.
Coal is becoming a less popular source of power, and an industry that used to
employ American citizens is relying less and less on human labor.
As the global and domestic markets shift, the current regulations are no
longer effective at protecting people and the environment. SMCRA is too
lenient because it allows too many companies to self-bond, either before or
after bankruptcy, and it allows companies to inappropriately rely upon their
subsidiaries. SMCRA does not sufficiently disincentivize abuse of its limited
requirements, especially when it comes to self-reporting. This problem is on a
fast track to becoming an epidemic. As more coal companies go under, more
mines will be abandoned without the necessary environmental clean-up,
leaving surrounding communities to suffer the harms of dirty air and water for
generations to come.
Bankruptcy highlights a major predicament that self-bonding can place
both a coal company and a permitting agency in. The policy behind selfbonding in support of allowing coal companies to not set aside reclamation
funds because they are sufficiently solvent is backfiring. The code regulating
the requirements for self-bonding makes it clear that a financially troubled
company headed toward bankruptcy must provide alternate bonds with
sufficient collateral. But the act of replacing self-bonds is not working in
practice, as demonstrated by the bankruptcy proceedings of some of the
country’s largest coal companies.
There could be various reasons why a coal company, such as Alpha
Natural Resources, has to file for bankruptcy before having the opportunity to
replace its self-bonded environmental liabilities. Allowing companies to selfbond through their subsidiaries seems to be the start of the financial issues
surrounding reclamation bonds. Historical patterns of the coal market show
that the market was resilient, and temporarily self-bonding through an affiliate
was more cost effective than replacing self-bonds until financially qualifying
again.203 Due to various market pressures (including an increase of renewable
resources, federal response to climate change, and a decrease in international
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Renewable Generation Capacity, supra note 55; Natural Gas Prices, supra note 50.
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demand), the coal industry may not rebound like it has in the past.204
Companies that have out self-bonded their liabilities, either in good faith that
the market would recover, or in an attempt to avoid incurring costs or
bankruptcy, are finding themselves in real trouble and unable to remain
financially stable.
Just as bankruptcy brings the problem to light, the process can play
multiple roles when a coal company files for chapter 11 and either has
inadequate reclamation self-bonds or could potentially post them in the future.
The Code could provide some relief as it stands. Under the bankruptcy
requirements of reorganization plan approval, a debtor must have a plan that
will “in good faith” accomplish the interests of creditors feasibly.205
In the case of a coal company that could requalify for self-bonds, or
achieve self-bonding status through a subsidiary, there may be questions of the
feasibility of the plan in the long run and raise issues of good faith. The
safeguard of § 1129(a)(11) could likely bolster the potential to use
§ 1129(a)(3) against inadequate self-bonding. Section 1129(a)(11) sets a
feasibility standard that requires a plan offer reasonable assurance, probability,
or prospect of success.206 Under that definition, either the current or potential
self-bonding comports with § 1129(a)(3), or the plan is not financially feasible
and therefore could not have been made in good faith.207 If, however, it cut the
other way and a court found a plan to be feasible, it in no way could be stopped
by allegations of bad faith.
A revision to the Code could strengthen the policy behind preventing
dangerous self-bonds. If the Code prevented companies with a history of
financial troubles and bankruptcy from receiving a permit under a self-bond, it
would provide financially stable coal companies with the benefit of a selfbond, while protecting the public from the possibility of having to pick up the
slack from a financially unstable company with inadequate reclamation selfbonds. The proposed carve-out would balance avoiding the shutdown of the
coal industry in the United States, with disallowing abuse of the bankruptcy
system to avoid reclamation liabilities.
The bankruptcy court could also play a role in resolving the issue by
making a call to Congress. The problem would be best solved at the source, by
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amending SMCRA to ban self-bonding all together, yet the current political
situation in Congress may pose a barrier to change in a timely manner. Taking
a page from Justice O’Connor, the most effective thing a bankruptcy court
could do is to promote change to the Code. Although this would also require
action by Congress, recognition of the issue as specific to bankruptcy may
push change along. A change to the Code to provide for an exception to selfbonding would be favorable to an outright ban under SMCRA. Allowing
flexibility would uphold the policies behind self-bonding as well as prevent
abuse.
Lastly, the court could support the rulemaking process underway by the
OSMRE.208 This option may be the quickest and politically safest option, but
not likely the most effective way to combat the nationwide issue. The issues
arising from the current energy market and longstanding environmental justice
concerns call for action to be taken to assure sufficient clean-up of used coal
mines.
No matter the mechanism used, bankruptcy can play a vital role in
resolving current and future harms to both the environment and people. As the
energy market changes in response to pressure from consumers and competing
energy sources, the way the coal industry operates needs to adjust to handle
operations more responsibly. Bankruptcy has increasingly become a forum for
coal companies to regroup and restructure; making the institution a ripe place
to make business practices more responsible.
Environmental degradation and harm to human health are not limited to the
coal industry. At a broader level, the analysis could be used outside the context
of coal companies and self-bonding. A large amount of environmental burdens
that fall within the hands of the government arise from bankruptcy.209 The
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), for example, gives the Environmental Protection Agency the
authority to mandate clean-up of hazardous waste sites.210 CERCLA has an
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established fund from the government to take care of clean-up costs of sites
contaminated with dangerous pollutants. CERCLA has a limited budget and a
growing number of sites obtained through bankruptcy and abandonment.211
And in the face of the recent election, the EPA may have even less support for
site clean-up.212 The degrading process could look to the Code for help.
In a manner similar to how bankruptcy could alleviate some pressure from
the rising problem of self-bonding for coal companies, looking at how gaps can
be filled in the Code can provide a blueprint for reducing the American
taxpayer’s share of the abandoned environmental liabilities from other federal
statutes as well.
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